Slovenian indebtedness problems in 2012 affl icted countries with sustainable budget balances. Divergences in infl ation, competitiveness and relative wage costs were already observable among the eurozone countries. For example, the cumulative growth of unit labour costs (ULC) between 1999 and 2006 was just 1.5 per cent in Germany, but 25.2 per cent in Greece, 23.2 per cent in Spain and 27.7 per cent in Portugal.
In the single European market, it seems that the individual external balances of member states became a neglected aspect of their economic health. In the catching-up member states with above-average infl ation, the single interest rate set by the European Central Bank (ECB) proved to be too low, in the sense that very cheap credit made it preferable to spend in the present instead of saving for the future. Meanwhile, the single currency caused nonadjustable real appreciation in these countries. This higher infl ation ruined the wage competitiveness of these countries by increasing wage demands. The additional infl ation and the increasing wages originated in external credit, creating additional demand. The relatively cheap credit -which originated from non-local sources -primarily fi nanced the consumption of imported products and services. The onset of the debt crisis, which stems from this external indebtedness, revealed the trap that the eurozone peripheral countries entered into, wasting the advantages offered by the single currency in order to fi nance cheap imports through the utilisation of foreign (public and private) credit. These countries can neither devalue their currencies to improve their current accounts nor depreciate their public debt through infl ation. An exit from the currency union would also be no easy solution for these externally indebted countries, as their debts 2 Ibid., Table 1 .
The global fi nancial crisis that began in the US shocked the EU in several ways, with the prolonged eurozone debt crisis being the biggest challenge facing the member countries. The period 2010-2012 proved that the eurozone periphery had complex structural problems. At fi rst glance, many of these countries face an endless debt sustainability problem stemming from two parallel concerns, namely ongoing annual budget defi cits and declining production. However, there is a deeper structural problem as well, namely their external imbalances. Moreover, this structural problem endangers those member states which appear to be the most stable among the eurozone peripheral countries.
Without doubt, several factors contributed to the European crisis, including the expansion of household indebtedness through the products of fi nancial innovation, the speculative bubbles in the real estate market and service sector, and the abundance of liquidity due to expansionary monetary policy. However, Neményi and Oblath observed that it was not only those countries which had been subject to the EU's excessive defi cit procedure that got into trouble.
1 The Baltic sudden stop in 2007 or the
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The second way, based on real adjustment, can be a starting approach for further analysis of intra-eurozone imbalances. This is built on the Keynesian automatic income adjustment mechanism. It focuses on the imbalance of savings (S) and investment (I), and it derives the current account (CA) from the imbalance of trade, capital market and public sector.
where Y is the output, C is the household consumption, G is public consumption, X is exports and IM is imports. Based on this equation, savings looks as follows:
where T is tax revenue of the government. T is equal to G if there is a balanced budget, but obviously, in the case of indebted eurozone countries, it is preferable to calculate with the assumption of a fi scal imbalance (T < G).
From Equation 4, the Keynesian conclusion is that if there is a current account defi cit, adjustment can happen only through real terms. In other words, savings must be raised (with a parallel decrease in consumption), investments must be reduced or the public budget defi cit should be reduced. 6 This serves as a theoretical explanation as to why the crisis-stricken eurozone countries have to impose restrictions on public spending and private income in a single currency zone, where a currency devaluation is not an option.
There is an advanced eclectic variation of the Keynesian IS-LM model approach on external balances, which is called the Mundell-Fleming model. In the case of indebted countries in a single currency zone, the version of the model that uses a pegged foreign exchange rate and fi scal expansion is relevant (see Figure 1) . In this theoretical model, the assumed process is that the fi scal expansion shifts the IS-curve right, and the IS-LM equilibrium moves from E 1 to E 2 . This leads to higher interest rates and thus to capital infl ux. To protect the pegged foreign exchange rate, monetary policy must expand the money supply, so the LM-curve is pushed right, moving the equilibrium to E 3 . This results in higher output (Y 1 to Y 3 ).
would remain denominated in euros. Thus, it would only multiply their debt crises, since a sharp currency devaluation could be expected immediately following an exit from the eurozone.
3
The ECB's single interest rate, despite the disparate levels of infl ation in the member states, worked to the benefi t of high-infl ation countries in the loan market, but this also discouraged private savings in these countries. It can be demonstrated in time series of the effective exchange rates and unit labour costs in the eurozone that there has been real appreciation in the member states with high infl ation in comparison to those with low infl ation. This reverse Balassa-Samuelson effect would have been a motivation for excessive intra-community imports in externally indebted countries. The rise of wages in countries suffering from real appreciation explains the loss of competitiveness in their exports and the relative cheapness of imports there.
The external imbalance problem
As Alessandrini et al. argue, the eurozone crisis is not merely a debt crisis but also an external imbalance problem, which is particularly the result of a lack of fi scal discipline. 4 The movement of products, services and capital within the eurozone is a homogeneous money market. This can be seen in two ways.
The fi rst is based on nominal adjustment, according to which the fl exible price level mechanism or the automatic monetary mechanism can be used to explain the balance of payment procedures in a homogeneous international money market situation. 5 In this approach, which is built on the theories of David Hume and Milton Friedman, an external imbalance implies that some volume of euros has been accumulated by some of the eurozone members, and the rest of the members must have accumulated the products. There is no way to adjust for external imbalances, since there is no monetary autonomy in the euro community. Besides, there are tax and fi scal differences among the eurozone countries, as well as labour market imperfections. Thus, the assumptions of perfect equilibrium and the distortion-free movements of factors and commodities -on which the neoclassical model is based -are missing here.
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country.
9 Until there is a fi scal union, the credit and bond markets will continue to redistribute funds for countries with external defi cits, but they do so in an uncontrolled way, which results in opportunities for speculative attacks against individual eurozone states. The foreign/national ratio in the composition of public and private debt infl uences the yield, and thus a cumulative current account imbalance leads to higher yields on debt. As Komáromi examined through empirical data, the net fi nancing capability of a country depends on the current and the capital accounts. 10 The higher the weight of demand for net fi nancing through the current account -i.e. the debtgenerating items -the more unfavourable is the structure of external indebtedness. As Garber describes, the fear of default and the fear of exit from the eurozone will ultimately result in a shortage of credit supply and thus in debt crisis.
11
It is worth emphasising that in an open economy it is very likely that savings and investments correlate very weakly with each other. This differs from the closed economy assumed by Keynes, in which savings and investments are supposed to be equal. In their "new open economy model", Obstfeld and Rogoff emphasise the phenomenon of free international movement of national savings, 12 and thus the free international fi nancing of investments, which is called the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle. 13 In accordance with this puzzle, Afonso and Rault state that if savings and investments are not correlated, the budget defi cit and the current account defi cit "tend to move jointly". 14 As neither individual devaluation nor a federal bail-out mechanism have been employed, the unsolved external imbalances can result in divergence, regression and the degradation of externally indebted countries. This is known as the reverse Balassa-Samuelson effect. 15 The Balassa-Samuelson effect views the higher infl ation of 9 P. A l e s s a n d r i n i , M. F r a t i a n n i , A. H u g h e s H a l l e t t , A. But why does the model version not work in the case of eurozone countries? As described in the optimum currency area models of Mundell, McKinnon and Kenen, 7 national economies can adjust individually to asymmetric shocks in an economic community via fl exible factor markets, monetary policy or community funds. The eurozone factor markets are not perfect, especially the workforce mobility. Monetary policy in the eurozone is an EU-level competence and thus is unable to consider the asymmetric impacts in its actions. Only fi scal instruments remain, but most of the fi scal actions must be taken at the national level, as there is no signifi cant fi scal redistribution at the EU level. 
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there. 18 In other words, the fi scal processes contributed to the emergence of the reverse Balassa-Samuelson effect. However, Lane and Milesi-Feretti found limited correlation between public debt and external imbalances in highly developed countries. catching-up countries as the result of rising productivity in the catching-up tradable sector, which causes wage increases and thereby infl ation pressure in the non-tradable sector. 16 The reverse Balassa-Samuelson effect (see Figure 2) describes how the relative price changes among countries lead to productivity divergences in the following way: In the eurozone, the quick convergence of interest rates (see Figure 3 ) resulted in overheated consumption in the periphery economies of the eurozone. The expectations of households based on sharply decreasing interest rates were unfounded, but they resulted in fast-growing private indebtedness, particularly through the consumption of non-tradable services. This latter impact raised the wage demands in the local non-tradable sector, which spilled over to the tradable (export) sector. Consequently, the countries' export competitiveness deteriorated, while local infl ation rose due to the higher wage costs. S o u r c e : Author's construction.
• Effect of size of a company or a country, as less capitalised countries pay higher returns 27 (SIZE)
• The investment and capital demands of national industries (D K )
• The external fi nancing demands and crowding-out impact of public fi nances (FNGBL = foreign net government borrowing or lending)
• The impact of crises, i.e. GDP contraction, a negative wealth shock on savings assets, increasing public spending and the end of an abundance of international credit (CYCLE).
The following function can thus be used to express the current account (CA):
If the monetary union remains fi rmly opposed to fi scal union, there are some alternative currency union practices in the world economy. For example, in the CFA franc zones of West and Central Africa, there are criteria for external payment arrears and external defi cits. In the planned Gulf Monetary Cooperation, there is a minimum criterion for foreign reserves.
Proof for problems of external imbalance and real appreciation in the eurozone
We now examine the imbalances of several countries. Both the centre-periphery imbalanced current accounts and the reverse Balassa-Samuelson effect are included in the data. As regards the eurozone periphery, it must be kept in mind that Slovenia (in 2007), Slovakia (in 2009) and Estonia (in 2010) adopted the euro much later than the other countries under analysis, which reduces their single currency time series. However, it should also be noted that Estonia began using a peg to the euro in 2004, making the country a quasi-participant in the single currency, • Real GDP growth and its impact on savings 22 or on consumption, based on future income 23 (GDP)
• International competitiveness based on real effective exchange rates (REER)
• Stages of development, as there is an assumed Ushape relationship between current account balance and relative per capita income (GDP/capita)
• Positive correlation of money stocks to GDP and savings 24 (corr(M , S/GDP))
• The continuity/smoothness of labour productivity growth 25 (Prod L )
• Inherited debt (Debt t-1 )
• The effect of transparency on lower risk (TRANSP)
• Restrictions on current accounts and capital accounts, for example capital controls (GC = government control)
• Deviation from uncovered interest rate parity (IRPDEV)
• Portfolio impact, i.e. the degree to which investors are rebalancing their portfolios by selling their low-risk bonds with high yields to counterbalance their losses on risky bonds 26 (PORTF)
• Market valuation impact, i.e. the degree to which investment products are overvalued according to P/E and fundamental value ratios (P/E)
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competitive (see Figure 5 ). The crisis years, however, led to increased wage competitiveness in most of the peripheral countries, primarily because of decreases in nominal wages. While a similar crisis-prompted adjustment is evident in the reductions of current account imbalances, this rebalancing process is far from complete.
Empirical analysis
The model and data
The hypothesis is that in a single currency zone, the REER determines the CA balance of member states. According to Equation (5), it is possible to create a full procedure for regression on CA:
in the sense of a fi xed foreign exchange base of prices, wages, ULC, nominal effective exchange rate, etc.
28
The analysis focuses on the current account imbalances of several eurozone peripheral countries -Estonia, Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia and Slovakiaand compares them with a core country, Germany. Table  1 shows that the overall current account balances of the peripheral countries grew increasingly negative in the euro membership period of 2000-2008. Once the fi nancial crisis erupted, local import consumption fell, which reduced these defi cits. However, current accounts never returned to zero (let alone surplus) in Estonia, Greece, Spain and Portugal. Conversely, the German current account surplus remained at a high level following the outbreak of the crisis.
As can be clearly seen in Table 2 , Slovakia is the only peripheral country that has competitive trade relations with Germany. A similar, although not so unambiguous conclusion can be drawn from the changes in terms of trade (see Figure 4 ). The price-based index expresses the relative increases in Portuguese, Spanish and Greek export prices compared to Germany. The rest of the surveyed group did not suffer from relative price disadvantages according to the terms of trade.
In terms of unit labour costs (ULC), in the years prior to the crisis, the peripheral countries lost wage competitiveness as the German ULC fi gures steadily grew more Theoretically, the relative development and productivity levels of countries are included in the REER, as their price and wage competitiveness levels form the basis of the REER calculation. 32 Thus, valuation changes among developed member states with varying levels of development will not distort the relative competitiveness included in REER.
Analysis
The analysis of the EU28 and eurozone groups of countries showed no correlation between CA and REER CPI or REER ULC . For a 20-year period, the r 2 is between 0.000 and 0.002. The signifi cance is well under the acceptable level, and therefore we have to discard the hypothesis that the REER explains the CA of eurozone or EU28 countries generally. The one exception is for the EU28 if the REER CPI is used as the predictor (see Table 3 
In the case of REER, the primary focus of this analysis, the calculation can be based on ULCs and the consumer price index (CPI), as calculated by defl ating with the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP). It is useful to calculate the strength of CA determination by all three REER types. That is, the regression functions applied in this study are the following:
The REER data are from the European Commission, DG-ECFIN Price and Cost Competitiveness statistics, the CA data are from the Eurostat. The REER and CA data are in quarter breakdown. The regression analysis in SPSS includes all the states that were eurozone members in 2014 and covers the time period 1994Q1-2014Q1. As a control calculation, the regression analysis is extended to the EU28 countries for the same period. 29 Finally, a third analysis focuses on six of the periphery eurozone countries with external imbalance problems and covers only the irreversible pegging or currency board period. 30 The 
